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DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND
COMMERCIAL TORTS
by
Michael Curry* and Melissa Krakauer**
I. STATUTORY AMENDMENTS
ERHAPS as a consequence of its broad application, the Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices - Consumer Protection Act (DTPA)1 has been
amended in virtually every legislative session since its enactment in
1973. Several bills introduced during the 1989 session sought to eliminate
much of the procedural and substantive protection afforded Texas consum-
ers under the DTPA. The bill that ultimately passed, however, affects only
two procedural and two limited substantive issues under that statute. On the
other hand, the legislature passed amendments to the Texas Property Code2
(the Code) that dramatically alter the rights and remedies of consumers and
homebuilders. A brief discussion of these statutory changes follows.
A. The 1989 Amendments to the DTP4
The 1989 DTPA amendments apply to any action commenced on or after
September 1, 1989, unless statutory notice was given prior to that date and
suit filed within 120 days after the date of delivery or mailing of the notice.3
The amendments are not keyed to accrual of the cause of action as were
earlier amendments. 4
Pre-Suit Notice. A consumer must now give written notice advising the de-
fendant in reasonable detail of his specific complaint at least sixty days prior
to filing suit.5 During the sixty-day period, the defendant may inspect the
goods or services in question at a reasonable time and place. 6 Refusing to
permit the inspection results in forfeiture of the mandatory additional dam-
ages available for the first $1,000 of actual damages. 7
* B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality,
Smithers & Curry, Austin, Texas. Adjunct Professor of Law, The University of Texas.
** B.S., J.D., The University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Bragg, Chumlea, McQuality,
Smithers & Curry, Austin, Texas.
1. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1990).
2. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
3. Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ch. 380, §§ 6-7, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1493.
4. Cf Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 685 n.1 (Tex. 1980) (revision of DTPA
in effect when unlawful conduct occurs governs disposition of case).




Tender of Settlement. The amendments provide that any tender or offer of
settlement is not admissible as evidence.8 Also, when the amount offered is
the same as, substantially the same as, or more than the amount of actual
damages, as determined by the trier of fact, the consumer may recover only
the lesser of the amount tendered or the actual damages.9
Waiver by Consumers. The DTPA declares that a consumer's waiver of the
provisions of the DTPA is contrary to public policy and unenforceable.10
The new amendments carve out a narrow exception to this prohibition when
five conditions are met: (1) the consumer was represented by legal counsel
during the transaction; (2) the waiver was set forth as an express provision in
a written contract signed by both the consumer and the consumer's lawyer;
(3) the transaction did not involve the purchase or lease of a family resi-
dence; (4) the transaction involved consideration in excess of $500,000; and
(5) the consumer was not in a significantly disparate bargaining position."'
The amendments make clear that waiver is an affirmative defense, and,
therefore, the defendant must plead and prove all five of the above condi-
tions.12 Moreover, disparate bargaining position cannot be proven or dis-
proven as a matter of law solely by evidence of the consumer's relative
financial position or by recitations contained in a written. contract as to the
relative bargaining positions of the parties. 13 Thus, it is difficult for a de-
fendant to win a summary judgment motion based solely on the defendant's
net worth relative to the consumer's or on a fine print provision in a contract
between the parties that professes equal bargaining positions.
Comparative Responsibility Defenses. The most significant of the 1989
DTPA amendments provides that certain "tort reform" principles 14 apply in
DTPA actions for (1) wrongful death, (2) personal injury other than mental
anguish or distress, and (3) damage to property other than goods acquired in
the consumer transaction if the damage arises out of an occurrence involving
death or bodily injury.15 In these DTPA cases only, the defendant may as-
sert comparative responsibility as a defense.16 Also, in these cases the con-
sumer may receive additional statutory damages only upon a showing of
fraud, malice, or gross negligence.1 7 Additional damages are no longer lim-
ited to three times the actual damages; rather, they may not exceed the
greater of four times the amount of actual damages or $200,00018
8. Id. § 17.505(d).
9. Id.
10. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42 (Vernon 1987).
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.42(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) (emphasis supplied).
12. Id.
13. Id. § 17.42(b).
14. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.017, 41.001-.009 (Vernon 1986
& Supp. 1990).
15. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
16. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.003.
17. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
18. Id. § 41.007.
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B. The 1989 Amendments to the Texas Property Code 19
The Texas Property Code (the Code) amendments apply to all actions to
recover damages for residential construction defects, except actions for per-
sonal injury, survival, or wrongful death or for damage to goods.20 Recover-
able damages in residential construction cases generally include the cost of
repairing the structure, any residual loss of value to the home due to the
stigma associated with certain major structural defects, and any mental
anguish suffered by the consumer.21 The recent amendments to the Code
primarily impact two areas. First, the amendments provide new defenses to
homebuilders and contractors. Second, the amendments require home-
buyers to give homebuilders notice and an opportunity to repair.
Defenses to Liability. The Code expressly provides defenses to liability for
damages, or any percentage of damages, caused by four specific events:22 (1)
negligence of a person other than the contractor or his agent, employee, or
subcontractor;23 (2) failure of a person other than the contractor or his
agent, employee, or subcontractor, to take reasonable action to mitigate the
damages;24 (3) normal wear, tear, or deterioration; 25 or (4) normal
shrinkage due to drying or settlement of construction components within the
tolerance of building standards.26 These four limitations on liability are not
intended to limit other defenses which may be applicable to a specific case.27
The term "normal" is not defined in the Code. Clearly, however, the pur-
pose of these provisions is not to excuse defective construction. There is
nothing normal about a cracked foundation that results from a contractor's
failure to take into account the soil conditions under a house. Similarly,
bowed walls could not be considered normal when they result from the use
of improperly cured lumber. Instead, the legislature intended these provi-
sions to protect homebuilders who use good homebuilding practices.
28
Notice and Opportunity to Repair. Common law did not require that the
homebuyer notify the builder and afford him an opportunity to repair the
defects. Most homebuyers do not want the builder to perform major repairs
because they believe that if the builder did not construct the home properly
in the first place, then the builder is incapable of properly repairing the
home. The amendments, however, require that the homeowner give notice
sixty days before suit is filed.2 9 Moreover, the contractor must be given an
19. The 1989 amendments to the Texas Property Code are set forth in chapter 27 of the
Texas Property Code. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.001-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1990). Chapter
27 is titled "Residential Construction Liability."
20. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.002.
21. See BRAGG, MAXWELL & LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LmGATON 2d § 8.03
(1983).
22. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.003.
23. Id. § 27.003(a)(1).
24. Id. § 27.003(a)(2).
25. Id. § 27.003(a)(3).
26. Id. § 27.003(a)(4).
27. Id. § 27.003(b).
28. See id. § 27.003-.004.
29. Id. § 27.004(a).
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opportunity to inspect the home for the alleged defects within twenty-one
days of receiving notice of the lawsuit.30
The pre-filing notice letter must specify the claimed defects in reasonable
detail.31 The reasonableness of the detail contained in the notice letter
should be examined in light of the relative positions of the parties. The ade-
quacy of the pre-filing letter, therefore, should be tested by determining
whether the information provided is sufficient to put the builder on notice
that defects in construction exist.
Within thirty-one days after receiving notice, the prospective defendant
may make an offer to repair or to pay for the repair of the defects in the
home.32 The offer to repair must specify in reasonable detail the repairs that
will be made.33 The reasonableness of the detail in the contractor's letter
offering to repair should be tested by determining whether sufficient informa-
tion is presented to enable a homebuyer to determine whether the repairs
will be effective. If a contractor's offer to repair is accepted, the repair work
must be completed within forty-five days after the date on which the
homebuilder received the homebuyer's acceptance of the offer to repair.34
If the consumer files suit before satisfying the notice provisions, the de-
fendant may move for the court to abate the lawsuit. Such abatement allows
the defendant an opportunity to inspect the home and to make an offer to
repair the alleged defects. 35 If a homebuilder fails either to make an offer to
repair or to properly and timely perform the offered repairs, or if the
homebuyer reasonably rejects an offer to repair, then the limitations on dam-
ages provided by the Code do not apply.36 If a homebuyer unreasonably
rejects an offer to repair or to pay for repairs, or accepts a settlement offer
and subsequently does not permit the contractor to repair the defects, then
the homebuyer may not recover damages in excess of the reasonable cost of
repairs plus attorney's fees incurred before the offer was rejected. 37
When a contractor makes repairs in the time allowed and in a good and
workmanlike manner, a homebuyer may not recover any damages, attor-
ney's fees or court costs arising from the defects unless the trier of fact finds
that a repair attempt was not made in good faith and did not cure the defects
30. Id. Different provisions apply if the limitations period will expire within the pre-suit
notice period, or when the claim is asserted as a counterclaim. Id. § 27.004(c).
31. Id. § 27.004(a).
32. Id. § 27.004(b).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Section 27.004(c) expressly authorizes an abatement "[ilf, while a suit.., is pending,
the statute of limitations ... would have expired and it is determined that the [notice] provi-
sions.., were not properly followed, the suit shall be abated for up to 75 days in order to allow
compliance... " Id. § 27.004(c). Presumably, even if the statute of limitations would not
have expired, abatement would be the proper remedy for noncompliance with the statutory
notice provisions. Cf. BRAGG, MAXWELL & LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LmGATION (2nd)
§ 1.07 (1983) (abatement not proper if defendant fails to raise issue of lack of notice in that
court).
36. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(e); Miller v. Presswood, 743 S.W.2d 275, 281 ('ex.
App. - San Antonio 1987, writ denied).
37. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.004(d).
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in questioti. 38 This provision appears, however, to unjustifiably forfeit the
homebuyer's right to recover damages for any residual loss of value to the
home remaining after completion of the repairs.3 9
Finally, when the defects in a home imminently threaten the health or
safety of the inhabitants, the Code requires the contractor to take reasonable
steps to cure the defect as soon as practicable5 ° If the contractor fails to
respond promptly, the homebuyer may have the defect cured and recover
from the homebuilder the cost of the repairs, attorney's fees and court costs,
as well as any other damages to which the homebuyer may be entitled.41
II. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRAcTICEs ACT
A. Status as a Consumer
Only consumers have standing to bring a lawsuit under the DTPA.42 Sev-
eral cases decided during the Survey period dealt with the question of a
party's status as a consumer.43
For example, in National Bugmobiles, Inc. v. Jobi Properties" the pur-
chaser of a home brought suit for breach of warranty against the extermina-
tor who had treated the home for termites for the prior owner. The
exterminator had issued a retreatment warranty guaranteeing that any addi-
tional treatment required during the term of the warranty4s would be per-
formed at no cost. The policy of the exterminator was to automatically
transfer the warranty to subsequent owners; the purchasers received the war-
ranty from the sellers at closing. Within the term of the warranty, the home-
owners discovered termites and requested the exterminator to treat the
house, but he refused. On appeal, the exterminator argued that the pur-
chaser was not a consumer. The court of appeals, applying well-established
rules, rejected this argument.46
A plaintiff who does not himself seek or purchase the services of the de-
fendant may nonetheless be a consumer if (1) he. acquires the benefits of
38. Id. § 27.004(c).
39. Cf. Ludt v. McCollum, 762 S.W.2d 575 (rex. 1988) (DTPA allows recovery for
residual loss of value).
40. Tsx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 27.0040).
41. Id.
42. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50 (Vernon 1987); Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett,
Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981).
43. The DTPA defines consumer as:
[Ain individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or agency
of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services,
except that the term does not include a business consumer that has assets of $25
million or more, or that is owned or controlled by a corporation or entity with
assets of $25 million or more.
TEx. Bus. & COM CODE A4N. § 17.45(4) (Vernon 1987).
44. 773 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
45. The warranty term was one year but renewable annually upon payment of a fee. Id. at
619.
46. Id at 622.
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those services as part of a transaction involving a sale or lease;47 and (2) the
services form the basis of his complaint.48 The court held that the purchaser
acquired the benefits of the retreatment warranty by automatic assignment
when he bought the property.49 The exterminator's failure to honor the
warranty formed the basis of the purchaser's complaint.50 The court fol-
lowed established case law in holding that privity of contract was not re-
quired for standing as a consumer, 51 and specifically held that privity was
not "necessarily required in order to establish a breach of an express
warranty."0
52
Rodriguez v. Ed Hicks Imports53 presented the question of a bystander's
status as a consumer. Rodriguez suffered injuries when the radiator on his
girlfriend's automobile exploded, spraying him with scalding liquid. Rodri-
guez, however, was not involved in the purchase of the car. The court of
appeals affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant on Rodriguez'
DTPA claim, correctly holding that since Rodriguez had neither sought nor
acquired by purchase or lease any goods or services, he was not a
consumer.
54
In Plaza National Bank v. Walker 5 Haywood Walker brought suit as
next friend of his daughter, Beth Walker, alleging that the bank committed
deceptive trade practices in offsetting Beth's savings account to satisfy a
past-due note owed by Haywood.5 6 The court held that a savings account
depositor acquires services sufficient to qualify him as a consumer.57 In so
holding, the court followed La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank,58
which established that a bank's services provided in connection with a
checking account fall within the scope of the DTPA.59
47. Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985) (party who seeks or acquires goods
or services purchased for his benefit by another is consumer).
48. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. 618 S.W.2d at 535, 538 (Tex. 1981) (consumer
must seek or acquire goods or services by purchase or lease and goods or services must form
basis of complaint).
49. National Bugmobiles, 773 S.W.2d at 621.
50. Id. at 622.
51. Id.; Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983);
Cameron, 618 S.W.2d at 541.
52. National Bugmobiles, 773 S.W.2d at 622. The court held that
[w]here an exterminator furnishes a perpetual, freely transferable express writ-
ten warranty, which warrants that it will unconditionally treat any future ter-
mite infestation, knowing that the home owner is likely to one day use the
warranty to induce the sale of the home, no privity between the buyer of the
home and the exterminator is required.
Id.
53. 767 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
54. Id. at 191. Clearly, if the daughter, rather than her boyfriend, had been injured, she
would have been a consumer even though the vehicle was purchased for her by her mother.
See Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 368 (rex. 1987); Kennedy v.
Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985).
55. 767 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
56. Id. The opinion's recitation of facts is sketchy but supports this reconstruction.
57. Id. at 278.
58. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
59. Id. at 564.
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In contrast, the court in Smith v. United States Bank 60 rebuffed a bank
customer's claim to consumer status. In that case, Scruggs borrowed money
from a bank to repay certain creditors who threatened to foreclose on his
property. Smith guaranteed the note. United States Bank of Galveston
purchased the note and Smith's guarantee. Ultimately Smith was sued on
his guarantee, and he sought relief against the bank under the DTPA. The
court of appeals reasoned that the bank was not liable under the DTPA to
Smith unless Scruggs was a consumer.61 Relying on Riverside National
Bank v. Lewis,62 the court held that Scrugg's objective in borrowing the
money was not the purchase of goods or services but rather the repayment of
a debt.63 In the court's view, Scruggs had sought only an extension of credit,
and, accordingly, was not a consumer.64
Thomas C. Cook Inc. v. Rowhanian 65 presented the question of whether
the purchaser of travelers checks had consumer standing to sue the issuer of
the checks under the DTPA. The plaintiff purchased the checks from the
original purchaser. The plaintiff lost the checks and sought a refund from
the defendant who issued the checks. The defendant denied the refund on
the grounds that, at the time of plaintiff's purchase, the checks already had
been signed and countersigned in violation of the instructions provided at
the time of issuance.66 The court held that generally the purchaser of trav-
elers checks purchases a service: the right to a refund if the check is lost or
stolen.67 The court, however, denied consumer status to the plaintiff in this
case.68 The court reasoned that the original purchaser was not a consumer
of the refund service since he failed to comply with the countersignature
instructions.69 In the court's view, the plaintiff, a subsequent holder of the
checks, occupied no better position than the original purchaser.70
While the court's detailed discussion of the rights of the parties under the
60. 767 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
61. Id. at 824.
62. 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1980). In Riverside, the Texas Supreme Court held that money
is not a good and the mere extension of credit is not the rendition of a service. Accordingly,
one who attempts to borrow money is not, by that activity alone, seeking to acquire a good or
service. Id. at 174-75. The Riverside rule has been construed narrowly in subsequent cases.
See Flenniken v. Longview Bank & Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex. 1983) (purchaser of
house is consumer as to both home builder and lender); Knight v. International Harvester
Credit Corp., 627 S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982) (purchaser of truck is consumer as to both
retailer and lender).
63. Smith, 767 S.W.2d at 824.
64. Id. If Scruggs sought merely to refinance a loan, then the court's analysis would be
correct. Scruggs' objective in obtaining the loan, however, was apparently to pay off the liens
held by the party threatening foreclosure. If so, Scruggs arguably utilized the loan proceeds to
acquire superior title to real property. The purchase of real estate is a good under the DTPA.
The stronger rationale may have been that Smith, as a guarantor, did not himself seek or
acquire goods or services.
65. 774 S.W.2d 679 (rex. App. - El Paso 1989, no writ).
66. The instructions required the checks to be countersigned at the time of purchase and
not before. The court held that a countersigned check is not entitled to refund if lost or stolen.
Id. at 683.
67. Id. at 682.





terms of the travelers check agreement may be correct, its analysis of the
DTPA consumer issue unfortunately confuses the question of standing with
the question of liability under the DTPA. Clearly, both the original pur-
chaser and the plaintiff were consumers as they both sought to acquire by
purchase the refund services of defendant.71 The original purchaser actually
acquired the defendant's services at the time of purchase but later lost his
right to a refund by prematurely countersigning the checks. 72 The plaintiff,
through no fault of the defendant, did not succeed in acquiring the refund
services he sought. While that fact, without more, did not establish that the
defendant committed a deceptive trade practice, it did not negate plaintiff's
consumer standing.
B. Breach of Warranty
In Stewart T'tle Guaranty Co. v. Cheatham73 a landowner sued its title
insurer under the DTPA for losses resulting from the insurer's failure to
reveal in the title policy the existence of an easement across the insured
property. There was no evidence that the insurer was aware of the title de-
fect. The trial court rendered judgment for the owner for treble damages.
The court of appeals reversed. 74 The court of appeals described the title
policy as a contract of indemnity that only obligated the insurer to pay the
insured for damages upon the failure of the guaranty.75 The court further
articulated that the title insurance company was not a title abstract company
employed to examine the title; the title insurance company had no duty to
disclose the existence of an easement, but only to indemnify the insured
against any loss caused by the title defects. 76 The court held that the title
policy made no warranty that the land was free of easements except for the
purpose of indemnifying the landowner under the policy terms.77 It is im-
portant to recognize that the court's holding does not preclude DTPA
claims whenever a title insurance policy is involved.78 A title insurer may
71. See, e.g., Mother & Unborn Baby Care v. State, 749 S.W.2d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1988, writ denied) (party seeking but not receiving service qualifies as consumer), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 2431, 104 L.Ed.2d 988 (1989); McCrann v. Klaneckey, 667 S.W.2d 924, 926
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (party who sought but did not acquire insurance was
a consumer); Irizarry v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1985, no writ) (similar language).
72. See supra note 63.
73. 764 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).
74. Id. at 322.
75. Id. at 318.
76. Id. at 319. The Cheatham court's no duty holding is correct since a party does not
have a duty to disclose unknown facts. Robinson v. Preston Chrysler - Plymouth, Inc. 633
S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex. 1982). Cf. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 772 S.W.2d 242, 246
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ) (title company had no duty to discover and
disclose the title defects, but could be held liable for non-disclosure) (emphasis in original).
77. Cheatham, 764 S.W.2d at 319. The court held that the title defect did not constitute a
breach of warranty, but a failure by the insurer to indemnify for any loss would constitute a
breach. Id. at 319 n.3.
78. The court noted:[T]his is not to say that there cannot be a violation of the DTPA when a title
insurance policy is involved. The mere existence, however, of a title policy and a
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still be held liable for misrepresentations or failure to disclose known facts.79
One of the issues in Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Ina 80 concerned whether an
implied warranty arose in connection with the rendition of medical services.
The defendant hospital administered epidural anesthesia to Easterly during
the delivery of her child. The first attempt at anesthetizing Easterly failed
and the catheter used in the procedure broke and remained in Easterly's
spine. This required subsequent surgery. Among other claims, Easterly and
her husband sued for breach of warranty under the DTPA. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the hospital. Affirming the trial court's
opinion, the court of appeals held that the primary relationship between the
hospital and Easterly involved the rendition and procurement of services,
the delivery of her child, and not the sale of goods, and, therefore, no im-
plied warranties arose under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).81 The
court refused to recognize the existence of an implied warranty in the rendi-
tion of medical services.82
Finally, in a decision of current interest, the court in Diversified, Inc v.
Gilbratar Savings Association8 3 refused to find an implied warranty in the
sale of property at a foreclosure sale.84 The court concurred with the view
expressed in another case that one who purchases property at a foreclosure
sale does so "at his own peril.
s85
C. Deceptive Trade Practices
In Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge86 the purchaser of a used car
claimed that the seller represented the vehicle was of a particular standard,
quality or grade when it was of another.87 The court of appeals found no
evidence to support the jury finding of misrepresentation. The Texas
Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence that the brakes began groan-
ing within a few months of purchase, the odometer had been rolled back
approximately 20,000 miles, and the brakes were "metal to metal" five
months after the purchase estabished that the brakes were excessively worn
subsequent loss under the terms of that title policy because of an undisclosed
easement is not such a violation.
Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted).
79. See, e.g., Stewart, 772 S.W.2d at 246 (title company may be held liable for misrepre-
sentations and non-disclosure); Gibbs v. Main Bank, 666 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. App. - Houston
[lst Dist.] 1984, no writ) (court remanded case to trial court for determination of whether title
company and seller conspired to conceal information of pre-existing lien on property).
80. 772 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
81. Id. at 214.
82. Id. at 214-15. Texas law currently does not recognize an implied warranty in the
provision of professional services. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1985).
83. 762 S.W.2d 620 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
84. Id. at 622.
85. Id. quoting Diversified, Inc. v. Walker, 702 S.W.2d 717 (Tex App. - Houston [Ist
Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
86. 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).
87. Section 17.46 (b)(7) prohibits "representing that goods or services are of a particular
standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of
another." TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(7) (Vernon 1987).
1990]
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and defective at the time of sale. 88 Therefore, the salesman's statement that
there was nothing wrong with the brakes misrepresented the standard, qual-
ity or grade of the vehicle.8 9
Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc.90 involved the purchase by Best of a Harley-
Davidson motorcycle dealership. The purchase included the inventory that
was subject to a floor planning lien held by a third party. Best testified that
at the time of the franchise sale, the seller misrepresented that Best would be
able to buy inventory from Harley-Davidson. In fact, however, the dealer-
ship as sold did not include this right. After the purchase, the third party
sued the seller and repossessed the inventory, which effectively put Best out
of business. Best brought suit alleging that the seller had violated section
17.46(b)(12) of the DTPA.9 1 The court of appeals found no evidence linking
the misrepresentation to the lost profits damages awarded by the jury;
rather, the damages resulted from the third party repossession. The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, holding in a per curiam opinion that Best's testi-
mony constituted legally sufficient evidence of a misrepresentation that pro-
duced his subsequent damages.92
D. Damages
A recurring question in the area of DTPA damages concerns the proba-
tive effect of a consumer's testimony as to the value of his real or personal
property. 93 The leading case is Porras v. Craig,94 in which the Texas
Supreme Court held that a property owner is qualified to testify about the
market value of his own property even though that owner would not gener-
ally be qualified to render an opinion about the value of property belonging
to others.95 The owner's testimony "must show that [the opinion] refers to
market [value], rather than intrinsic or some other value of the property. '96
Pontiac v. Elliott,9 7 decided during the Survey period, presented another
challenge to the consumer's valuation testimony. The consumers in that
case purchased a Suburban from the defendant. Unknown to the consumers,
the vehicle previously had been sold to another buyer who returned it com-
88. Donwerth, 775 S.W.2d at 636.
89. Id.
90. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 314 (March 21, 1990).
91. Section 17.46(b)(12) prohibits "representing that an agreement confers or involves
rights, remedies, or obligations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by
law." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12).
92. Best, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 314.
93. See, ag., Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1984) (property owner may tes-
tify regarding market value of own property even though could not testify regarding value of
another property); Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v. Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 848 (rex.
App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (similar language); Bower v. Processor and Chemical Serv.,
Inc., 672 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (similar language).
94. 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1984).
95. Id. at 504.
96. Id. at 505. The court noted that this requirement is normally satisfied by asking the
witness if he is familiar with the property's market value. Id. The court concluded that the
owner's testimony reflected the value of the vehicle to him personally rather than its market
value. Id.
97. 775 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. App. - Houston (1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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plaining of engine problems. The defendants had adjusted the engine prior
to the consumer's purchase. One of the consumers testified that in light of
the prior ownership, damages, and repairs, her assessment of the value of the
vehicle was zero. She testified that she would not have bought the vehicle
had she known its history, stating that the vehicle would not have been
worth a cent to her.98 The court held that there was nothing in the testi-
mony to show that the consumers were referring to market value rather than
an intrinsic or personal value, and, accordingly, there was no evidence to
support the finding that the vehicle was worthless at the time of delivery.99
Justice Dunn dissented, arguing that the consumer based her opinion on the
defective and unsafe condition of the vehicle. 100 Although the consumer did
not use the word "market," the testimony as a whole reflected an opinion as
to market value, rather than a loss of value due to personal reasons. 10 1
Relying on Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, In ,102 the Pontiac court also
held that one of the consumers, Mrs. Elliott, could not recover for her
mental anguish because she failed to prove that the defendant knowingly
committed the misconduct that caused her mental anguish.'03 The Texas
Supreme Court, however, has held that either knowing conduct or resultant
physical injury authorizes the recovery of damages for mental anguish.104
Recently, the courts have abolished the physical injury requirement in other
contexts, and have authorized mental anguish damages without proof of sci-
enter or a resulting physical injury. 10 5 The Texas Supreme Court's broad
language suggests that the physical injury requirement generally has been
discarded. 10 6 If so, the Pontiac court's holding is overly restrictive.'0 7
In Danny Darby Real Estate, Inc. v. Jacobs08 Jacobs contracted to
purchase a tract of land from the defendant. Based upon the defendant's
representation that Jacobs was eligible for financing through the Texas Vet-
98. In addition, the husband testified that the vehicle was not worth anything at the time
of sale due to its defective condition.
99. Pontiac, 775 S.W.2d at 399.
100. Id. at 402.
101. Id. This case is extremely close. The testimony clearly would have been sufficient had
the questioner or witness referred to market value. See Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc. v.
Dickenson, 720 S.W.2d 844, 849-50 (rex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
102. 667 S.W.2d 115 (rex. 1984).
103. Pontiac, 775 S.W.2d at 400.
104. Luna, 667 S.W.2d at 117; Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 617 S.W.2d
918, 921 (rex. 1981) (mental anguish damages recoverable upon showing of willful tort, gross
negligence, willful disregard or physical damage); Duncan v. Luke Johnson Ford, Inc., 603
S.W.2d 777, 779 (rex. 1980) (similar language).
105. St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987) (abolished requirement of
proof of physical injury in suits alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress); Moore v.
Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. 1986) (abolished physical injury requirement in wrongful death
cases).
106. St. Elizabeth, 730 S.W.2d at 650 (physical injury no longer required for mental
anguish recovery in intentional torts, gross negligence, or willful and wanton disregard of an-
other rights); Moore, 722 S.W.2d at 684 (similar language).
107. See Centroplex Ford, Inc. v. Kirby, 736 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no
writ) (dictum) (proof of physical injury not required to recover for mental anguish); Kold-
Serve v. Ward, 736 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1987, writ dism'd) (dictum)
(proof of physical injury not required to recover mental anguish damages).
108. 760 S.W.2d 711 (rex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (on remand).
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erans Land Board, and with the defendant's permission, Jacobs purchased a
mobile home and expended money improving the land. Jacobs did not re-
ceive the financing, resulting in loss of the land and sale of his mobile home.
Jacobs brought suit to recover his deposit and down payment on the mobile
home and his expenses for improvements to the land. On appeal, the court
held that Jacobs was entitled to these damages.l°9 In so holding, the court
relied upon well-established authority that a DTPA consumer can recover
the greatest amount of actual damages, including related and reasonably
necessary expenses, if he proves the damages were caused by the deceptive
trade practice.' 10 The only qualification is that the damages sought be of a
type available at common law."1
In Carrow v. Bayliner Marine Corp. 11 2 the Austin court of appeals consid-
ered the type of proof necessary to recover repair costs. The case involved
the purchase of a motoryacht, which the jury found to be defective. The
Carrows, the purchasers of the boat, brought suit against the manufacturer
and retailer seeking rescission or, alternatively, damages. The trial court de-
nied the request for rescission and rendered judgment against the manufac-
turer for some, but not all, of the damages found by the jury to have resulted
from DTPA violations. Three of the jury findings of repair costs were disre-
garded for lack of evidence. On appeal, the manufacturer sought to uphold
the trial court's action, arguing that there was no evidence the repairs were
reasonable, no evidence to support the amount of the repairs and that rescis-
sion was not available under the facts of the case.
The court of appeals first addressed the damages issue. The court ac-
knowledged the traditional rule that repair costs are compensable only when
the consumer establishes the repairs were necessary and the costs reason-
able. 1 3 The court held that the consumer is only required to present suffi-
cient evidence from which the trier of fact may justifiably conclude that the
repairs and costs were necessary and reasonable.' 14 In addition, the court
held that it is not fatal to recovery that the witness failed to use the words
"reasonable" and "necessary." 1 5 The court held that the Carrows' expert's
objective estimate of the cost of repair constituted evidence from which the
jury could infer that the repairs were necessary and the cost reasonable.1 16
109. Id. at 718-19.
110. Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (rex. 1985). The Jacobs court added that a
consumer is not limited to the out of pocket or benefit of the bargain measures of damages.
Jacobs, 760 S.W.2d at 718-19.
111. Kish, 692 S.W.2d at 466.
112. 781 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ).
113. Id. at 693. See, Pena v. Ludwig, 766 S.W.2d 298, 304 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, no
writ) (evidence of repair costs insufficient to establish reasonableness); GATX Tank Erection
Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (evidence that repairs were necessary does not establish reasonableness). The Car-
row court found it unnecessary to reach the issue posed by the concurring opinion in Jacobs v.
Danny Darby Real Estate, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. 1988) (Kilgarlin, J., concurring) as
to whether proof of the reasonableness and necessity of damages is required under the DTPA.
Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 693-94.
114. Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 694.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 695. The court further held that for the purposes of a no evidence challenge it
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The court also analyzed types of relief available under DTPA section
17.50(b)(3). 117 It first considered rescission, as contemplated by the UCC,
which under certain circumstances authorizes a buyer to reject a product or
revoke acceptance of a product and receive restitution of the purchase
money."1 8 The court held that a consumer may avail himself of this remedy
under DTPA section 17.50(b)(3). 119 The jury found that the Carrows ac-
cepted the boat and there was no finding that the Carrows revoked this ac-
ceptance. The court held that in the absence of proof of revocation, the
Carrows were not entitled to "rescission" under the UCC.12o
The court next considered the remedy of equitable rescission and restitu-
tion pursuant to section 17.50(b)(3) of the DTPA. The court held that to
obtain equitable rescission a purchaser must give timely notice of rescission
and return or offer to return the product and the value of any benefit derived
from its possession.121 The court rejected the Carrow's claim to equitable
rescission because they failed to prove compliance with these
requirements.12 2
Finally, the court acknowledged authority for the position that section
17.50(b)(3) provides an independent statutory right to obtain restoration of
money and property independent of any equitable rights or-rights under the
UCC.12 3 Without deciding that such right exists, the court held that the
purchasers could not avail themselves of this relief because they failed to
obtain a jury finding as to what property the defendant obtained in violation
of the DTPA. 124
was not necessary that the amounts found by the jury correspond precisely with the amounts
to which the expert testified. Id.
117. Section 17.50(b)(3) authorizes "orders necessary to restore to any party to the suit any
money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired in violation of this sub-
chapter." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3).
118. See TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.602, 2.608 (Vernon 1968). The court cor-
rectly noted that the UCC does not deal with rescission per se, but rather with rejection and
revocation of acceptance. Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 695.
119. Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 695; see Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Pierce, 768 S.W.2d
416 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, no writ); Freeman Oldsmobile Mazda Co. v. Pinson, 580 S.W.2d
112, 113 (rex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
120. Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 696.
121. Id. The court further cautioned that continued use of the product with knowledge of
the grounds for rescission will forfeit any right to that relief. Id.
122. Id. The court reasoned further that since there was no contract between the manufac-
turer and the Carrows, there was no basis to award rescission from the manufacturer - i.e.,
there was nothing to rescind. Id.
123. Id. It is clear that the DTPA creates an independent statutory right to restoration of
money or property. This conclusion is compelled by the fact that the DTPA does not codify
the common law or impliedly incorporate other statutes but rather creates an independent
statutory cause of action. See Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980). Accord-
ingly, a consumer is entitled to recover the money or property acquired by the defendant
without the requirement of proving grounds for equitable rescission or statutory rejection or
revocation of acceptance. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3). The court's reference
to codification of the equitable remedy of rescission and incorporation of the UCC was
unfortunate.
124. Carrow, 781 S.W.2d at 696. Under the facts of the case, the court's holding that the
verdict did not justify § 17.50(b)(3) restoration is corrrect. A party seeking statutory restora-
tion should obtain a finding, separate and apart from any damage finding, of the amount of




As a general rule, in a case involving more than one claim the court can
award attorney's fees only for necessary legal services rendered in connec-
tion with the claims for which recovery is authorized. 25 Accordingly, the
party seeking attorney's fees generally must allocate the time spent between
those causes of action for which attorney's fees are available and those for
which they are not, except when the claims are so interrelated as to require
proof of essentially the same facts.1 26 In one DTPA case decided during the
Survey period, failure to segregate fees between multiple defendants did not
bar an award of attorney's fees because the exception to the general rule
applied.127 In that case, the suit for rescission of a mobile home purchase
contract brought against the manufacturer, the seller, and the financer as-
signee involved the same set of circumstances and the issues were so interre-
lated that prosecution of the suit required proof of the same facts. 128
Therefore, a special issue on the amount of attorney's fees attributable to
each defendant was not necessary.' 29
A defendant who prevails on a DTPA claim is entitled to an award of
attorney's fees if the court finds the action was groundless, brought in bad
faith, or to harass the defendant.1 30 In Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-
Dodge, Inc. 131 the Texas Supreme Court expressly held that the court, and
not the fact finder, must make this determination of groundlessness, bad
faith, or harassment. 132 Reversing the decision of the court of appeals, the
court held that "groundless" under the DTPA has the same meaning as
"groundless" under rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 133 Under
that rule, groundless means: "No basis in law or fact and not warranted by
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law." 134 The court held that the Donwerths' action as a matter of law was
not groundless. 135 The court further stated that although Preston II had not
preserved its contention that the Donwerth's action was brought for the pur-
pose of harassment, Preston II probably could not have prevailed on that
claim.136 The court reasoned that since this provision requires that the suit
prove the amount of damages caused by the defendant's misconduct as a predicate for restitu-
tion or restoration. Green Tree Acceptance v. Pierce, 768 S.W.2d 416, 419-20 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1989, no writ).
125. See International Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck, 496 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1973).
126. Southern Concrete Co. v. Metrotec Fin., Inc. 775 S.W.2d 446, 448-49 (Tex. App. -
Dallas 1989, no writ); Bullock V. Kehoe, 678 W.S.2d 558, 560 (rex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
127. Green Tree, 768 S.W.2d 416.
128. Id. at 425.
129. Id.
130. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c).
131. 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).
132. Id. at 637. The court held that it is a question of law reviewable on appeal under an
abuse of discretion standard.
133. Id.
134. TEx. R. Civ. P. 13.




be brought solely to harass, a case that was not groundless would not be
likely to result in a finding of harassment.1 37 In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Phillips disagreed with this logic, reasoning that the language of the
amended statute demonstrates that a finding of harassment alone will justify
an award of attorney's fees. 138
In Splettstosser v. Myers,139 the court relied on Don werth to again reverse a
court of appeals' judgment on bad faith attorney's fees. 14 In holding that
the action was not groundless as a matter of law, the court of appeals rea-
soned that when a plaintiff's DTPA cause survives a motion for directed
verdict, neither the trial court nor an appellate court logically can find the
lawsuit groundless.1 41 Expressly disapproving this standard, the court re-
manded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the evidence
as a whole demonstrated an arguable basis in fact and law for the consumer's
claim. 142
Although decided before Don werth, Kenbel v. Port Enterprises, Inc. 143 pro-
vides a useful discussion on the issue of bad faith.144 To establish bad faith,
the defendant must prove that the consumer's suit was motivated by a mali-
cious or discriminatory purpose. 145 Although not a prerequisite, personal ill
will or spite on the part of the consumer toward the defendant is relevant to
the issue of malice. 14 6 If no ill will exists, the defendant may be able to show
that the consumer was motivated by a reckless disregard for the defendant's
rights. 147
F Defenses
In Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc. 148 Chief Justice Phillips, writing for
the court, held that the discovery rule is a plea in confession and avoidance
and not an affirmative defense.1 49 The party availing itself of the discovery
rule, therefore, must plead the rule in response to the defendant's assertion
137. Id. "Because any purpose for recovering money damages, however small, as a moti-
vating factor would defeat such a finding, it is difficult to conceive of a case which was not
groundless but was brought for purposes of harassment." Id.
138. Id. at 639 (Phillips, C.L, concurring).
139. 779 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1989).
140. Id. at 807.
141. Myer v. Splettstosser, 759 S.W.2d 514, 518 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988), rev'd, 779
S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1989).
142. Splettstosser, 779 S.W.2d at 808. In its defense, the court of appeals' opinion did cor-
rectly anticipate the Texas Supreme Court's holding that the question of bad faith attorney's
fees is one for the court. The court of appeals also held that harassment alone would not
support the award of bad faith attorney's fees.
143. 760 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).
144. Id. at 831-32. The court's discussion on the issue of groundlessness, id. at 832, should
be read in fight of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-
Dodge, 775 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. 1989).
145. 760 S.W.2d at 831.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 832.
148. 769 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1988).
149. Id. at 517. Past opinions of the Texas courts have done little to clarify the application
of the discovery rule as a defense to limitations. See Smith v. Knight, 608 S.W.2d 165, 166
(Tex. 1980) (the discovery rule is an affirmative defense to statute of limitations); Weaver v.
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that the action is time-barred. 150 In addition the party invoking the discov-
ery rule must bear the burden of pleading and proof and the burden of secur-
ing favorable findings on the rule.151 Ms. Woods did not plead the discovery
rule at trial nor did either side request or obtain any issues as to when she
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered,
defendant Mercer's misrepresentations. Hence, the court held that Woods
waived her right to invoke the discovery rule and affirmed the court of ap-
peals' take-nothing judgment in favor of Mercer.152
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Kilgarlin noted that con-
tinuing misrepresentations would toll limitations as long as the misrepresen-
tations continued, and submitted that because Mercer failed to obtain
findings in support of the date of the last fraudulent act or misrepresenta-
tion, he waived limitations as a defense.' 53 In a separate opinion, Justice
Mauzy, joined by Justices Robertson and Ray, argued that because Mercer
failed to object to Woods' omission of a discovery rule issue, he waived the
right to complain that the suit was barred by limitations. 54 Because none of
the dissenting justices found conclusive evidence that Woods' cause was
time-barred, they deemed reversal of the court of appeals' judgment for Mer-
cer to be proper.' 55
The court reviewed the defense of indemnity in Plas-Te, Inc. v. U.S. Steel
Corp. 5 6 U.S. Steel manufactured and Plas-Tex sold allegedly defective
goods to the plaintiff. The trial court rendered judgment against U.S. Steel
for breach of warranty and violations of the DTPA and rendered a take-
nothing judgment in favor of Plas-Tex, ruling that U.S. Steel should indem-
nify Plas-Tex for its attorney's fees pursuant to DTPA section 17.55A (now
section 17.555). 157 U.S. Steel appealed and the court of appeals reversed and
remanded the entire case for new trial. The Texas Supreme Court held that
Witt, 561 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. 1977) (the discovery rule is not plea in confession and
avoidance).
150. Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 518.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court also confirmed that the DTPA limitations provision does not apply in
cases governed by the pre-1979 version of the DTPA. Id. at 517 n. 1. The court indicated that
the two year limitations provision in Tax. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon
1986) controlled in the case at bar. Id. at 517. If a claim is evidenced by or has grown out of a
written contract, then a four year statute of limitations would apply. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon 1986). See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Castillo, 616 S.W.2d
630, 633 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ).
153. Woods, 769 S.W.2d at 519.
154. Id. at 520.
155. Id. at 519-21.
156. 772 S.W.2d 442 (rex. 1989).
157. Id. at 443, 445. Section 17.555 of the DTPA provides:
A person against whom an action has been brought under this subchapter may
seek contribution or indemnity from one who, under the statute law or at com-
mon law, may have liability for the damaging event of which the consumer com-
plains. A person seeking indemnity as provided by this section may recover all
sums that he is required to pay as a result of the action, his attorney's fees
reasonable in relation to the amount of work performed in maintaining his ac-
tion for indemnity, and his costs.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.555 (Vernon 1987).
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section 17.55A was intended to incorporate into the DTPA "existing princi-
pals of contribution and indemnity law."158 The court held that the court of
appeals properly reversed Plas-Tex's award of indemnity for attorney's fees
because the indemnitor, U.S. Steel, had not been found liable to the plaintiff
(due to the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's finding). 159 Since
under established law no right of indemnity exists against a defendant who is
not liable to the plaintiff, 16° Plas-Tex had to await the results of the re-
manded trial before seeking indemnification from U.S. Steel. 161
Finally, in Quinn v. Memorial Medical Center16 2 the court of appeals af-
firmed summary judgment in favor of a hospital, finding that the plaintiff's
claim under the DTPA clearly was barred by the health care provider excep-
tion to the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.163 The plhin-
tiff alleged that the hospital pharmacist was negligent in dispersing a
prescription drug. The court concluded that as a result of the health care
provider exception, the hospital would not be held liable. 164 The court rea-
soned that since the pharmacist was acting within the scope of the employ-
ment relationship, there could be no action under the DTPA for negligent
acts.16S. Strictly speaking, this statement is correct. If the plaintiff had al-
leged the commission of breach of warranty, deceptive trade practice or un-
conscionable action by the pharmacist, however, the health care provider
exception would not apply since those claims involve conduct other than
negligence. 166
III. INSURANCE
Several notable cases during the Survey period addressed the issue of an
insurer's liability for unfair claims settlement practices. In Paramount Na-
tional Life Insurance Co. v. Williams 167 the insured, Mrs. Williams, sued
158. Plas-Tex, 772 S.W.2d at 446.
159. Id.
160. Id; Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 553 (rex. 1981).
161. Plas-Tex, 772 S.V.2d at 447.
162. 764 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
163. Id. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990) expressly
states:
Notwithstanding any other law, no provisions of Sections 17.41-17.63, Business
& Commerce Code, shall apply to... health care providers as defined in Section
1.03(3) of this Act, with respect to claims for damages for personal injury...
alleged to have resulted, from negligence on the part of any... health care
provider.
TEX. REC. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 1.03(3) (Vernon Supp. 1990) describes a health care
provider as any:[P]erson, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institu-
tion duly licensed or chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care as a
... hospital... or an... employee... thereof acting in the course and scope of
his employment.
164. Quinn, 764 S.W.2d at 918; accord Easterly v. HSP of Texas, Inc., 772 S.W.2d 211
(rex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ).
165. Quinn, 764 S.W.2d at 918.
166. See Alderman, The Business of Medicine -Health Care Providers, Physicians, and the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 Hous. L. REv. 109, 140-43 (1989).
167. 772 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
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her medical insurer after it denied two claims and cancelled her policy.
When Mrs. Williams applied for coverage, she was sixty-four and had a long
history of medical problems. She described her medical history to the in-
surer's agent, Cox, at the time she made the application, but Cox told her he
only needed information on the preceding five years. When Mrs. Williams
subsequently filed claims under her policy, the insurer denied them on the
grounds that she had failed to disclose her full medical history on her initial
application and that the illnesses for which she received treatment were pre-
existing conditions. The jury found all issues in Williams' favor and the
court of appeals, reviewing the insurer's twenty-five points of error, affirmed
subject to a partial remittitur.168
Among other rulings, the court held that the admission of petitions, plead-
ings and discovery from various lawsuits against the insurer was proper for
the purpose of showing a plan or scheme by which the insurer consistently
and purposely denied claims without reasonable investigation.1 69 The court
found sufficient evidence establishing Cox's apparent authority to bind the
insurer and rejected the insurer's tenuous argument that Cox acted on behalf
of Mrs. Williams in taking the application and, accordingly, any misrepre-
sentations would be attributable not to the insurer, but to Mrs. Williams.'170
The court also found the evidence sufficient to support the jury's findings
that the insurer had breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.'7 1 In
this regard, the court noted that the insurer did not investigate Mrs. Wil-
liams' contention that her medical condition had been fully disclosed to the
agent and that the evidence did not clearly establish that her claim arose
from a preexisting condition.172
In Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. San Benito Bank and Trust Co. 17 3
the title insurance company denied any breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing in connection with an adverse claim to the insured property.
Due to Transamerica's negligent omission of a prior lien from its description
of the insured's title policy, San Benito acquired only a third lien when it
believed it would be acquiring a second lien. The parties discovered the er-
ror when the true second lienholder posted the property for foreclosure. The
168. Id. at 259. The court ordered a remittitur of $250,000 of the $500,000 awarded as
exemplary damages. The court, however, sustained Mrs. Williams' crosspoint that requested
additional recovery, pursuant to statute, of twelve percent penalty damages on the amount of
loss due to the insurer's failure to pay within thirty days of demand. Id.; TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 3.62 (Vernon 1981).
169. Paramount, 772 S.W.2d at 259-60. In so holding, the court followed Underwriters
Life Insurance Co. v. Cobb, 746 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
170. Paramount, 722 S.W.2d at 261-62. The court pointed to the forms supplied to the
agent by the insurer which referred to the agent as a "Duly Licensed Representative." The
court discounted a disclaimer in the forms that the insurer was not bound by statements made
by the agent, holding it ineffective to negate the apparent authority bestowed on the agent. Id.
at 262. Finally, the court found sufficient evidence that the insurer had ratified the transaction
by retention of premiums with knowledge of facts that should have provoked inquiry into the
nature of the transaction. Id. at 267.
171. Id. at 265.
172. Id. at 264.




title policy gave Transamerica the right to reestablish the status quo of the
insured174 by settling the adverse claim to the property. Although Trans-
america instituted negotiations, it failed to reestablish the status quo or
otherwise protect San Benito's interest. In dismissing Transamerica's argu-
ment that it owed no obligation to act before a loss occurred, the court held
that once the insurer began to act in handling the claim, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing applied.175 Finding that the insurer breached this
duty,176 the court affirmed judgment for San Benito, including exemplary
damages. 177
Practitioners should be aware, however, that if the insured intends to
combine contract and claim handling causes of action in one suit, it may be
necessary to prosecute filly all causes of action. In Marino v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 178 the insured under a homeowner's policy
successfully sued on the insurance contract and alleged DTPA and Insur-
ance Code violations.179 Marino then brought a second suit alleging a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Both the trial court and
court of appeals held that res judicata barred Marino's good faith and fair
dealing claim in the second lawsuit, since he had raised the issue of State
Farm's claim handling in the first suit and could have, but did not, allege
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing.180
Hermann Hospital v. National Standard Insurance 181 involved the ques-
tion of a third party's standing to bring suit under article 21.21 of the Texas
Insurance Code.'8 2 In that case, the insured suffered a stab wound on the
job. He was taken to Memorial Hospital which subsequently sought to
transfer him to Hermann Hospital. Prior to accepting the transfer, Her-
mann Hospital contacted the insured's insurance company which verified
insurance coverage. When the insurer later denied coverage, the hospital
brought suit against the insurance company to recover the expenses incurred
in the treatment of the insured. The trial court granted summary judgment
to the insurance company. On appeal, the hospital contended that the trial
court erred in rejecting its claim under article 21.21. The court of appeals
agreed.' 83 The court pointed out that section 16(a) of article 21.21184 autho-
174. The title policy gave Transamerica three options in case of a claim. It could represent
San Benito in court and pay the actual amount of loss, pay the policy amount, or re-establish
the status quo by effecting a settlement. Id. at 774.
175. Id. at 775.
176. Id. at 776.
177. Id. at 777. See Arnold v. National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 168
(Tex. 1987) (exemplary damages are available for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing).
178. 774 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989), writ granted, 33 Sup. Ct. J. 96 (Nov.
22, 1989).
179. Although the insured alleged these violations, the insured did not submit jury ques-
tions or obtain findings on these allegations.
180. Marino, 774 S.W.2d at 109-10. Note that the Texas Supreme Court has granted writ
on the res judicata issue.
181. 776 S.W.2d 249 (Tex App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
182. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1981 & Supp 1989).
183. Hermann, 776 S.W.2d at 252.
184. Section 16(a) provides:
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rizes an action by any person who has been injured by another's unfair or
deceptive acts in the business of insurance. 185 The court refused to limit
standing to an insured or beneficiary under an insurance policy or to those in
the insurance business.1 86 The court observed that hospitals must rely upon
an insurer's representation of coverage and concluded that it could find no
reason to deny standing to the hospital.18 7
Despite a number of cases dealing with the application of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)188 to employee benefit plans, the
scope of ERISA's preemption of state law remains unsettled. 189 The
Supreme Court of Texas recently granted the applications for writ of error in
two cases presenting the question whether ERISA preempts state causes of
action for unfair insurance practices. 190 In both cases the Houston court of
appeals held that ERISA preempted the plaintiff's various state law causes
of action brought under common law theories, articles 21.21 and 3.62 of the
Texas Insurance Code, rules and regulations of the State Board of Insurance
and the DTPA. 191 The outcome of these cases should help determine
whether the statutory causes of action are saved from preemption as laws
regulating the business of insurance. 192
IV. FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Generally, a cause of action for fraud cannot be predicated on representa-
tions concerning matters of law because such representations constitute
Any person who has [been injured by] ... another's engaging in an act or prac-
tice declared in Section 4 of this Article or in rules or regulations lawfully
adopted by the Board under this Article to be unfair methods of competition or
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance or in any prac-
tice defined by Section 17.46 of the Business & Commerce Code, as amended, as
an unlawful deceptive trade practice may maintain an action against the person
or persons engaging in such acts or practices.
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.21.
185. Hermann, 776 S.W.2d at 251.
186. Id. at 251-52. In holding that standing is not limited to those in the business of insur-
ance, the court followed Ceshker v. Bankers Commercial Life Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 128, 129
(Tex. 1978). The court distinguished Chaffin v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 728 (Tex.
App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) in which the court denied standing under
article 21.21 to a party who sought to sue his tort-feasor's liability insurance company which
had wrongfully denied coverage.
187. Hermann, 776 S.W.2d at 252.
188. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985).
189. The preemption clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws that
relate to any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). The savings clause excepts
from the preemption clause any state law that regulates insurance. Id. § 1144 (b)(2)(A). The
deemer clause provides that no employee benefit plan shall be deemed to be an insurance
company for purposes of any state law purporting to regulate insurance. Id. § 1144 (b)(2)(B).
190. Cathey v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 764 S.W.2d 286 (Tex App-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988),
writ granted, 33 Sup. Ct. J. 41 (Oct. 18, 1989); Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 752 S.W.2d
710 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist] 1988), writ granted, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 40 (Oct. 18, 1989).
191. Cathey, 764 S.W.2d at 290; Gorman, 752 S.W.2d at 714.
192. See also Mayfield v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 605, 606 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(ERISA did not preempt plaintiff's claims under Texas Insurance Code to the extent that
article 21.21 fell within ERISA savings clause).
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statements of opinion rather than fact. 193 Thus, when the State asserted that
construction of a condominium partly on a public beach violated the Open
Beaches Act,194 the developer's action on the basis of fraud failed. 195 Since
the State's assertion or representation was a legal position, the court did not
even consider whether the construction actually encroached the public
easement. 196
Where a duty of disclosure exists, deliberate suppression of material facts
establishes fraud.197 In Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint Corp.198
Datapoint assigned two equipment leases to Chase but failed to disclose to
Chase that the lessee had filed bankruptcy. Pointing to a contract provision
by which Datapoint agreed to provide Chase a complete copy of any pro-
posed lessee's financial statement and other credit information, the appellate
court readily found probative evidence of a duty to disclose material facts
and reliance on such information. 199 The court viewed Datapoint's ac-
knowledgement of not disclosing the bankruptcy and its denial of any duty
to disclose as closely analogous to the denial of a promise coupled with a
failure to perform the promise,2°° and, as such, found evidence of fraudulent
intent.201
Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Ojeda De Toca v.
Wise,202 the Dallas court of appeals reversed a summary judgment on fraud
and DTPA claims that had been granted in favor of a vendor and broker of
real property.20 3 The vendor and broker had successfully argued in the trial
court that the purchaser had constructive notice of height restrictions
through deed records. The court held that constructive notice of the con-
tents of the real property records was not a defense to a claim for deceptive
trade practices and fraud.2°4 The defendants had further argued that since
the deed was subject to other outstanding interests, it did not purport to
convey property free of height restriction and any previous representations
to the contrary were merged into the deed, extinguished, and no longer ac-
tionable. The court rejected this argument, commenting that if the defend-
ants were correct, then a cause of action for fraud in the sale of real estate
193. See Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat'l. Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. 1987). Ex-
ceptions to this general rule arise when there is a relationship of trust and confidence between
the parties or when a party having superior knowledge takes advantage of another's ignorance
of the law in order to deceive him. Id.
194. TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 61.018 (Vernon 1978).
195. Executive Condominiums, Inc. v. Texas, 764 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, writ denied).
196. Id.
197. See State Nat'l Bank v. Farah Mfg. Co., 678 S.W.2d 661, 681 (Tex. App. - El Paso
1984, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
198. 774 S.W.2d 359 (rex. App. - Dallas 1989, no writ).
199. Id. at 366.
200. Id. at 367; accord Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986).
201. Chase, 774 S.W.2d at 367.
202. 748 S.W.2d 449 (rex. 1988) (imputed or constructive notice under real property re-
cording statutes is not defense to buyer's action for DTPA violations and fraud).





could never exist unless the deed itself contained the misrepresentation. 205
Hence, the doctrine of merger will not bar claims of fraud, accident, or mis-
take in transactions consummated in a deed.206
Finally, in Hermann Hospital v. National Standard Insurance Co. 20 7 a
hospital that had provided medical services to an insured patient sued the
insurer for negligent misrepresentation as well as misrepresentation and de-
ceptive trade practices under the Texas Insurance Code, based on the in-
surer's denial of the hospital's claim for expenses incurred. The hospital had
verified coverage with the insurer both before and after accepting the patient.
Relying on this representation of coverage, the hospital treated the patient
and incurred over $200,000 in expenses. The Houston court of appeals re-
versed summary judgment for the insurer and remanded the case.208 With
regard to the hospital's claim of negligent misrepresentation, the court stated
that the insurer owed a legal duty to those for whom it verified coverage
despite the fact that the verification service was gratuitous. 209 The court
further stated that even though contractual privity did not exist between the
insurer and the hospital, a duty of care was imposed by law.210 The court
noted that liability for negligent misrepresentation extends (1) to persons
whom the maker of the representation intends to benefit and (2) to those
who the maker should foresee will act in reliance upon the representation.211
The court held that the allegations raised a fact issue as to whether the in-
surer was liable for negligent misrepresentation. 212
V. ToRTIous INTERFERENCE AND BUSINESS DISPARAGEMENT
In Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 213 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed that
a cause of action exists for tortious interference with an employment con-
tract that is terminable at will.214 While working for Marathon Oil Com-
pany, James Sterner was injured. He filed suit against Marathon and
recovered damages for the injuries he suffered. Approximately five years
later, Sterner was hired by an independent contractor to work at Marathon's
refinery. On his third day of work, Sterner received a dismissal notice from
the contractor per Marathon's directive. The court held that the terminable-
at-will status of a contract is no defense to an action for tortious interference
with its performance. 215 The court noted that "[u]ntil terminated, the con-
tract is valid and subsisting, and third persons are not free to tortiously inter-
205. Id. at 511-12.
206. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has held that the defense of merger does not apply to
actions brought under the DTPA. Alvarado v. Bolton, 749 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. 1988).
207. 776 S.W.2d 249 (rex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
208. Id. at 250.
209. Id. at 253.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 254.
212. Id.
213. 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1989).
214. Id. at 688.
215. Id. at 689.
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fere with it. ' '2 1 6
Overruling prior decisions to the contrary,217 the court further held that
the privilege of legal justification or excuse in the interference of contractual
relations is an affirmative defense upon which the defendant carries the bur-
den of proof.218 The court stated that the jury's refusal to find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that Marathon acted with justification or excuse
meant, at law, that Marathon failed to carry its burden of proof.219 The
court held that Marathon did not establish legal justification or excuse as a
matter of law. 220
Several cases during the Survey period illustrate the importance of prov-
ing a causal connection between the tortious interference with a contractual
relationship and the plaintiff's damages. Although the court in Cantrell Oil
Co. v. Hino Gas Sales, Inc. 221 held that the covenant not to compete at issue
was reasonable and enforceable,222 it reversed the award of damages against
the competitor because the employer failed to show that the tortious interfer-
ence proximately caused his price cut damages.223 Luckily for the employer,
the court affirmed the award of damages against the individual employee
defendant because he failed to challenge this point on appeal.224 Similarly,
in Strain v. Gansle225 the court reversed a judgment for breach of covenant
not to compete and interference with contract because the causation of dam-
ages issue was contested at trial but no causation issue was submitted to the
jury.226 When the plaintiff meets the causation hurdle and proves that the
tortfeasor acted with actual malice, the plaintiff may recover exemplarydamages. 227
VI. CONVERSION
In Collision Center Paint & Body, Inc. v. Campbel1228 the buyer of an
216. Id.; (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 comment g (1979).
217. See Sakowitz, Inc. v. Steck, 669 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. 1984); Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v.
Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. 1976).
218. Sterner, 767 S.W.2d at 690.
Under the defense of legal justification or excuse, one is privileged to interfere
with another's contract (1) if it is done in a bona fide exercise of his own rights,
or (2) if he has an equal or superior right in the subject matter to that of the
other party.
Id at 691.
219. Id. at 690. Thus, the court's standard of review was whether justification or excuse
was established as a matter of law.
220. Id. On remand, the court of appeals held that the jury's failure to find that Marathon
acted with legal justification or excuse was not against the great weight and preponderance of
the evidence. Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 777 S.W.2d 128, 132 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th
Dist.] 1989, no writ).
221. 756 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ).
222. Id. at 783.
223. Id. at 785.
224. Id. at 786.
225. 768 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
226. Id. at 347.
227. See Corporate Wings, Inc. v. King, 767 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1989, no
writ).
228. 773 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. App. - Dallas 1989, no writ).
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automobile defaulted on payments owed to the purchase money lienholder,
Campbell, as well as repair costs owed to Collision Center. Pursuant to the
Texas Property Code, Collision Center sent a statutory worker's lien notice
to Campbell. 229 Campbell timely tendered payment of the amount stated in
the statutory notice, but Collision Center refused to release the vehicle,
claiming that additional storage fees and attorney's fees were due and owing.
The court of appeals held that Campbell's proper tender of the amount
claimed in the notice (which Collision Center never amended) was suffi-
cient,230 and that the subsequent refusal to surrender the car to the
lienholder constituted conversion. 231
Ames v. Ames 232 involved a suit for conversion and breach of fiduciary
duty brought by beneficiaries of a pension and profit-sharing plan against the
trustee of the plan and a third-party bank. The benefit plan had been organ-
ized pursuant to the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ER-
ISA).233 Addressing the question of whether the state court properly
exercised jurisdiction, the Texas Supreme Court held that the provisions of
ERISA did not continue to control because the benefit plan had been termi-
nated before the trustee wrongfully converted the funds to his own use.234
Hence, the beneficiaries' cause of action arose out of the failure or refusal of
the trustee of a terminated plan to convey benefits, and not the violation of
fiduciary duty created by ERISA in the continuing administration of a re-
tirement plan. 235 Given these circumstances, ERISA preemption did not
apply, and the state court properly exercised jurisdiction.236
229. A worker's lien arises under § 70.001 when a worker labors to repair a motor vehicle;
the worker may retain possession of the vehicle until paid. Tx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.001
(Vernon 1984).
230. Collision, 773 S.W.2d at 357.
231. Id.
232. 776 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1989).
233. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985).
234. Ames, 776 S.W.2d at 157.
235. Id. at 158.
236. Id.
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